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JURY REVIVAL OR JURY REVILED? WHEN
EMPLOYEES ARE COMPELLED TO WAIVE JURY
TRIALS
Michael H. LeRoyt
[T]he right of jury trial .... is no mere procedural formality, but
a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control
in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to
ensure their control in the judiciary.'
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [constitutional]
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the
value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference
between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a
valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of the Research Issue
Juries are waning on two fronts. Courts sentence convicted criminals.
However, in 1984 Congress enacted binding sentencing guidelines, a
sentencing system under which the court determines sentences according to
factors which have been set forth in sentencing guidelines.
3 Many states
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1. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (2004).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738, 757 (2005), concluded that the amended Federal Sentencing Act "makes the
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follow a similar course.4 These laws negate the fact-finding function of
juries during sentencing.5 The civil jury is also fading, due to judicial
encouragement of arbitration.6 This forum transfer is advocated to relieve
congested courts . Private judging is replacing public adjudication.
Individual employment arbitration exemplifies the decline of the civil
jury. Companies require individuals to submit employment disputes to
private judges.8  The Supreme Court's seminal decision, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 signals broad approval of this workplace
dispute resolution method. The problem is that employees are pressured to
waive access to a judicial forum, including a jury.'0  A few years after
Gilmer, millions of employees are now required to arbitrate. Firms
guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines
ranges ... but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns
as well." Id. (citations omitted).
4. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78
JUDICATURE 173, 174, tbl.l (1995) (listing and describing twenty-two state sentencing
guidelines systems, some of which are binding on judges).
5. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 ("When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes
essential to the punishment,' and the judge exceeds his proper authority." (citation
omitted)). See also Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 751 ("Booker's actual sentence, however, was 360
months, almost 10 years longer than the Guidelines range supported by the jury verdict
alone. To reach this sentence, the judge found facts beyond those found by the jury. .. ").
6. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
7. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary at the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1982), in 68
A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). In his memorable speech, Chief Justice Burger remarked, "[o]ne
reason our courts have become overburdened is that Americans are increasingly turning to
the courts for relief from a range of personal distresses and anxieties." Id. at 275. He
proposed to alleviate this caseload by "a system of voluntary arbitration." Id. at 277.
8. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting that offer of employment was rescinded after successful job applicant refused to sign
mandatory arbitration agreement).
9. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
10. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) (holding that a mandatory employment arbitration agreement for a state-law claim is
adhesive). The court stated, "[i]t was imposed on employees as a condition of employment
and there was no opportunity to negotiate. ... [T]he economic pressure exerted by
employers... may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the
employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job
because of an arbitration requirement." Id.
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embrace arbitration to lower dispute costs.1 But that is beginning to
change as employers question its value. Key rulings make trials less
expensive,12 while arbitrations are more costly.'
3  Remarkably, some
employers are discarding arbitration to return to court, but with a condition:
employees must waive access to a jury and agree to a bench trial.
This Article examines mandatory jury waivers in employment. These
are like Gilmer arbitrations because they are contractual, agreed to before a
dispute, and required for a job. Also, they aim to lower employer liability
by denying individuals access to part of the civil justice system. By
requiring bench trials, these contracts reflect a growing corporate belief that
judges, unlike juries, are indifferent to a firm's wealth.1
4  The Supreme
Court agrees that civil juries can be unreasonable.
5
Ironically, jury waivers preclude arbitration. Employers who select a
court relinquish criticized features of Gilmer arbitrations 
that favor them. 16
In another contrast, jury waivers alter only one civil justice element. They
do not impose an entire dispute resolution system on unwilling workers.
11. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DisP.
RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 9, 12 (discussing the cost of arbitration).
12. See infra note 77.
13. See infra notes 76 and 79.
14. Certain courts uphold jury awards based on evidence of what a "wealthy"
corporation is able to afford in damages, suggesting that jurors are biased against rich
companies. See, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding that firm's "great wealth supports the jury's award" of $200,000 in punitive
damages against the firm).
15. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("Arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice can replace reasoned
judgment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking.").
16. Structural advantages favoring employers include the repeat player effect, whereby
employers establish an arbitration system, select arbitrators, and capitalize on these
advantages as a "repeat player" for the arbitrator's services. In contrast, an employee
typically arbitrates only one dispute and therefore selects an arbitrator only once. See Lisa
B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 223 (1998)
(discussing the advantages repeat players have over one-shotters and noting that one-
shotters "are not able to form continuing relationships with courts or institutional
representatives"). Critics believe that the arbitrator's perception of being a repeat selection
predisposes him to rule in favor of the party who controls the system. See id. at 242 ("One
possibility is that arbitrators, freed from the free market constraint of having to worry about
future selection by both parties, might tend to rule in favor of the only party in a position to
maintain an institutional memory and use arbitrators again in the future, namely the
employer."). An employer's ability to require workers to pay forum costs-for example,
half the arbitrator's fee-is another inequality because firms are more able to absorb
arbitrator fees that run $700 to $2,000 per day. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille,
When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree
of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 160 (2002) ("The average
per diem fee charged by labor arbitrators has risen modestly to about $700, compared to
$2000 per diem fees for employment arbitrators.").
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Jury waivers also provide public adjudication of disputes. This enables
federal courts to perform a role that Congress prescribed, enforcing
employment laws.'7 New precedents evolve to update the statutes. 8
How do courts today treat pre-dispute jury waivers in employment
contracts? Gilmer suggests that judges should routinely enforce these
agreements. After all, if the Supreme Court approves compulsory
agreements that waive entire access to a court, judges should not think
twice about similar agreements that require a bench trial. My research of
early cases shows, however, that courts scrutinize the bargaining process
that results in these waivers. Adding to this surprising picture, lower courts
have not yet digested new Supreme Court pronouncements in criminal
cases that reaffirm respect for juries.' 9 Considering that the Constitution
provides individuals a jury in criminal and civil trials,2 ° is judicial revival
of civil juries far behind? Strangely, although jury waivers in employment
mark the first retreat from Gilmer waivers of the entire judicial forum and
signify a return to public courts, their enforcement is more difficult.
B. Organization of this Article
Part II examines selection of a judge, jury, or arbitrator for
employment disputes. Arbitration for discrimination claims was embraced
by Gilmer.21  Because this private forum offered many advantages,
17. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980) ("Of course, the'ultimate authority' to secure compliance with Title VII resides in the federal courts.").
18. As Gilmer arbitrations are widely adopted, they displace federal courts. As a result,
the Supreme Court is unable to play a corrective role in shaping employment law. Cf., e.g.,
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former employee may
bring a claim for retaliation); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
312-13 (1996) (holding that comparator in age discrimination case need not be under forty);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (rejecting view that sexual
harassment plaintiffs must show psychological injury in hostile work environment cases).
19. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
The Court reaffirmed the ancient common law jury rule that "'the truth of every accusation'
against a defendant 'should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
[the defendant's] equals and neighbors."' Id. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343).
20. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . .. trial, by an impartial
jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Similarly, the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
21. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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employers widely imposed it on their workers.22 But new evidence shows
that this forum is losing its appeal.2 3 Thus, employers are being urged to
choose courts over arbitration, provided that workers sign jury waivers.24
This Article also explores the intent of Congress to enforce its main race
discrimination law.25 Jury trials were prohibited at first because Congress
feared biased juries,2 6 but this presumption changed in 1991.27 Lawmakers
did not address jury trials when they passed an age discrimination law in
1967,28 but a decade later the law provided access to juries.29
The role that state law plays in jury waivers is analyzed in Part III.
After showing that common law regulates private employment,3 ° this
Article examines recent state court decisions on commercial jury waivers.31
Although the context is different, this Article explains how these rulings
relate to employment.32 Most state33 and federal34 courts enforce these
business contracts. However, California and Georgia courts have ruled that
individuals must have access to juries.35
Part IV discusses my sample of jury waiver decisions in employment
disputes.36  Table 1 summarizes key information from these cases,
including the jury clauses in these controversial contracts.37  Three
decisions that enforce jury waivers38 and two decisions that deny
enforcement,3 9 are analyzed. I conclude that courts scrutinize bargaining
between workers and employers to ensure that jury waivers are "knowing
and voluntary. 4 °
Part V revisits the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).4 1 Congress wanted to exempt employment contracts from this law
because workers do not have the same bargaining power as two businesses
22. See infra notes 63-68, 75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 76-77, 80-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 98-100 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 130-35.
32. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 130-35.
34. See infra note 136.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. See infra Table I at Part IV.A.
38. See infra Part IV.B.
39. See infra Part IV.C.
40. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
41. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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engaged in an arm's length transaction.42 Over seventy years later, the
Supreme Court ignored that intent.43  But the emerging experience in
commercial jury waiver cases has an ironic result. Most decisions uphold
these waivers because business owners demonstrate enough bargaining
sophistication to indicate a conscious forum-selection decision. Strangely,
however, even though judges routinely enforce entire waivers of courts in
Gilmer agreements, when they transplant this test from commercial cases to
employment disputes they pay more attention to the contract formation
process between workers and companies. As a result, they are less inclined
to enforce jury waivers. I predict that employers will need to choose
between jury trials and arbitration, both of which expose them to a greater
possibility of reviled punitive judgments.
II. WHO ADJUDICATES FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: JUDGE,
JURY, OR ARBITRATOR?
Who adjudicates federal employment disputes: a judge, a jury, or an
arbitrator? The answer is all of them, subject to certain qualifications.
Those conditions are explored here. Arbitration, the most recent addition
to the roster of employment adjudications, is examined first. Next, I
explore two federal employment discrimination laws that specifically
provide for a bench or jury trial. The fact that these laws currently
authorize a judge, jury, or arbitrator to adjudicate an employment dispute
glosses over serious disagreement between Congress and the Supreme
Court in their forum preferences. Congress wants employees to have
unfettered access to juries while the Supreme Court's strong approval of
arbitration implies its preference for private judges.
44
As I now show, mandatory jury waivers are a complex development.
Gilmer critics would seem to favor a new trend that allows more trials and
less forced arbitrations. They trust judges more than arbitrators to apply
42. See infra note 234, 60-62 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
44. These different perspectives are highlighted in a major lawsuit that challenged
mandatory arbitration in the securities industry. The district court in Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998) concluded that it is
"unlikely that the same Congress would in a single act create a new constitutionally-based
right to a jury trial for Title VII plaintiffs, only to erode that right by endorsing mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.... It makes little sense that Congress would have finally
recognized this right in one section of 1991 Act, and then undermined it in another." Id. at
205-06. On appeal, the First Circuit bluntly disagreed: "The district court's comment that
an endorsement of arbitration would be at odds with the 1991 CRA's creation of a right to a
jury trial ... ignores Gilmer's endorsement of arbitration under the ADEA-which also
provides for jury trials. It may also evince a distrust of arbitration that the Supreme Court
has long since disavowed." Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Femmer & Smith, Inc., 170
F.3d 1, 11 (lst Cir. 1998).
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discrimination laws. 5 They abhor employer hand-picking of arbitrators.46
But the very act of employer compulsion-even to improve upon
mandatory arbitration-would likely incite these critics.
4 7
A. Arbitrators as Adjudicators of Employment Disputes
1. Use of Arbitrators as Adjudicators of Employment Disputes Grow
in the 1990s
The Supreme Court's approval of mandatory arbitration is a major
development in employment law. The setting in Gilmer has broad appeal
to employers who face discrimination lawsuits. 48  Gilmer encourages
companies to make arbitration an unquestionable condition of
employment-to the point of firing otherwise good workers simply because
they refuse to sign these contracts.49
45. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 400-02 (1999) (arguing that using
judges rather than arbitrators to adjudicate employment discrimination cases better serves
the goals of the discrimination laws).
46. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1233 n. 152 (2000) (noting that "a
party might act opportunistically by selecting an arbitrator the party considers predisposed
to the particular argument the party will advance" and "the possibility of opportunistic
behavior in arbitrator selection provides repeat players ... a decided advantage in the
arbitral forum"); Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with
Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 863 (1999) (describing how parties
with superior bargaining powers use arbitration agreements to gain advantages by selecting
arbitrators).
47. Cf Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1996)
(comparing mandatory employment arbitration provisions to "yellow dog" contracts of a
century ago which compelled workers to refrain from joining or supporting a labor union).
48. Robert Gilmer, as a condition for being a registered securities broker, signed a
standard industry agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). In this case, his employer went to
court to transfer Gilmer's age discrimination lawsuit to arbitration, id. at 24, a venue that
Gilmer perceived as fundamentally unsuited for this kind of dispute. Id. at 30-32. Gilmer
argued that he had no ability to bargain over the contract, id. at 33, and in any event, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act precluded his waiver of access to federal court. Id.
at 27-29. The Court rejected these arguments, id. at 27-33, and held that Gilmer's age
discrimination claim could be subjected to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement. Id. at 23. The holding in Gilmer pertained only to arbitration agreements in
securities registration applications, which are contracts with the securities exchanges not the
employer, and therefore did not rule directly onarbitration as provided in employment
contracts. Id. at 25 n.2. Later, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109
(2001), the Court broadened Gilmer's narrow holding to apply the FAA to most
employment arbitration agreements.
49. See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002)
(noting that employer fired employees for refusing to agree to an arbitration provision).
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But mandatory employment arbitration pressures employees to waive
access to a court, including their right to a jury. ° The Gilmer majority
dismisses this concern." The Court rejects the idea that a private
proceeding deprives individuals of a judicial forum,52 thwarts the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) policy of eradicating age
discrimination,53 and undermines the role of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).54 The Court sees nothing amiss as long
as an individual has access to a forum that functions like a court.55 In the
view of the Gilmer majority, Congress enacted the FAA to counteract
judicial hostility to this private dispute resolution forum.
5 6
Gilmer exposes a serious problem in employee jury waivers. The
majority opinion does not address this issue directly. Its treatment of the
FAA's legislative history sidesteps the question of whether Congress
intended to enforce arbitration agreements only between businesses that
make commercial transactions,5 7 or whether lawmakers also intended that
this private forum be available to employers and workers.5 8 Instead,
50. See Armendariz v Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal.
2000) ("The party who is required to submit his or her claims to arbitration [forgoes] the
right, otherwise guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, to have those claims tried
before a jury." (alteration in original) (quoting Kinney v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 354 (Cal Ct. App. 1999))).
51. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (holding that an age discrimination claim "can be
subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement").
52. Id. at 29.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 28.
55. See id. at 26 (stating that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum" (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
56. The FAA, enacted in 1925 as the United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401,
43 Stat. 883 (1925), was re-enacted, codified, and renamed the Federal Arbitration Act in
1947. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)). Viewing the history of this law, the Gilmer majority said that "[i]ts
purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
57. See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (remarking that the law "creates no new legislation,
grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and
in admiralty contracts" (emphasis added)). When the bill was introduced in the House, its
sponsor, Representative Mills, explained that it "provides that where there are commercial
contracts and there is disagreement under the contract, the court can [en]force an arbitration
agreement in the same way as other portions of the contract." Id. at 11,080 (emphasis
added). See also H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (describing the need for the law); S.
REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that by avoiding "the delay and expense of litigation,"
arbitration appeals "to big business and little businesses ... corporate interests [and] ...
individuals").
58. The President of the Seamen's Union of America expressed the objections of
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Gilmer emphasizes more recent court approval of arbitration.5 9 Thus, it
ignores congressional intent to limit the FAA to business contracts.60 The
majority opinion sets aside congressional concern about the inequality of
bargaining power between large businesses who want to avoid courts and
ordinary workers who are powerless to resist this pressure. 6' This, in turn,
organized labor at the 1923 annual convention of his union:
[T]his bill provides for reintroduction of forced or involuntary labor, if the
freeman through his necessities shall be induced to sign. Will such contracts be
signed? Esau agreed, because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that
caused slavery to begin and continue. With the growing hunger in modem
society, there will be but few that will be able to resist. The personal hunger of
the seaman, and the hunger of the wife and children of the railroad man will
surely tempt them to sign, and so with sundry other workers in "Interstate and
Foreign Commerce."
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126 n.5 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original). In response to this strong concern, Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover suggested that "[i]f objection appears to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the
law's scheme, it might be well amended by stating 'but nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce."' Id. at 127 (alteration in original).
59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 ("Such generalized attacks on arbitration 'res[t] on suspicion
of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."' (alteration
in original) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989))).
60. In Section 1 of the FAA, Congress enacted an exemption of contracts between
certain workers and their employers. See § 1, 61 Stat. at 670. In approving this exclusion
for the employment contracts of "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," id., Congress appeared to agree with the
President of the Seamen's Union. Senator Walsh of Montana expressed concern for the
adhesive nature of employment contracts as well as contracts between large businesses and
smaller businesses who lack power to negotiate contract terms:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy;
there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no
power at all to decide it. Either you can make that contract or you can not make
any contract. It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man
says, 'These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.' Well, there is nothing
for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his
case tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has
no confidence at all.
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (emphasis added).
61. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29-30 (interpreting the FAA as being intended "to place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts" and therefore rejecting the
argument that the likelihood of unequal bargaining power in agreements to arbitrate
employment claims should prevent their enforcement).
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relates to whether employees have adequate bargaining power to negotiate
a jury waiver.62
These debating points did not interest employers when Gilmer was
decided. They heeded the opinion's strong arbitration signal, and con-
cluded that this private forum was a panacea to a growing litigation crisis.63
Arbitration was then touted for limiting employer damages.64 It offered
privacy65 and protected documents from discovery. 66  Early evidence
suggested that arbitration was faster and more economical than trials. 67 By
unilaterally selecting arbitrators, employers also improved their odds of
defeating discrimination claims.68  They added to these advantages by
requiring workers to pay forum costs associated with private judging.69
Following Gilmer, courts are more willing to enforce mandatory
arbitration agreements.7 °  Although these contracts are similar to
compulsory jury waivers,7 ' the latter face more scrutiny from courts.72
62. See infra text accompanying notes 184, 199, 205, and 226.
63. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as
Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-4 (May 14,
1997) (surveying 530 Fortune 1000 companies and finding that seventy-nine percent of
employers have used arbitration).
64. See Ken May, Arbitration: Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory
Programs as Risk Management, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-5 (May 14, 2001)
(reporting an employment lawyer's belief that mandatory arbitration limits damages and
class action lawsuits).
65. See EEOC, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, EEOC Notice 915.002 (July 10,
1997) (discussing the "lack of public disclosure"), available at 1997 WL 33159163, at *6.
66. See id. ("Discovery is significantly limited compared with that available in court
and permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
67. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir.
2001) (noting that "[t]he arbitration of disputes enables parties to avoid the costs associated
with pursuing a judicial resolution of their grievances. By one estimate, litigating a typical
employment dispute costs at least $50,000 and takes two and one-half years to resolve.").
68. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381, 428 (1996) ("[S]tatutory
discrimination grievances relegated to... arbitration forums are virtually assured employer-
favorable outcomes," given "the manner of selecting, controlling, and compensating
arbitrators, the privacy of the process and how it catalytically arouses an arbitrator's desire
to be acceptable to one side.").
69. See, e.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2, 4 (D.D.C. 2000)
(recounting that an employee was assessed $8,376 for the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) forum fees).
70. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 249, 301 tbl.1
(2003) (showing that federal district courts enforced 51.3% of challenged arbitration
agreements before Gilmer, 66.1% of agreements after Gilmer and before the Court's 2001
Circuit City decision, and 66.7% of agreements after Circuit City).
71. L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (1998) ("We begin by noting
that jury trial waivers entered into in advance of litigation are similar to arbitration
agreements in that both involve the relinquishment of the right to have a jury decide the
JURY REVIVAL OR JURY REVILED?
Perhaps this is because courts invest so much in arbitration.73 The
difference is odd considering that an individual is equally bound to forgo a
jury under both agreements-but few courts are bothered by the fact that
mandatory arbitration also forces individuals to waive their constitutional
right to a jury.1
4
2. Use of Arbitrators as Adjudicators of Employment Disputes Is
Now Questioned
Sold on arbitration after Gilmer, employers flocked to this dispute
resolution method.75  Now, they are having second thoughts.76  Defying
convention, some employment arbitrators order whopping punitive
damages.77 Paradoxically, as companies switch to mandatory arbitration,
facts of the case.").
72. See infra Part IV.C.
73. See, e.g., Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(observing that the "Supreme Court has noted that the FAA promotes a 'liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements"' (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
74. A rare example of an opinion that connects a concern over loss of jury access with
the more general loss of access to a judicial forum is Chief Judge Bennett's strongly worded
critique of mandatory arbitration in Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D.
Iowa 2000). Although the case involves a commercial arbitration dispute between a multi-
billion dollar food processor and a small farmer, this economic relationship is akin to a
multi-national corporation that requires an individual employee to arbitrate: "In light of
what is likely to be a rising tide of arbitration of disputes in our society, there is a real
potential that literally hundreds of thousands of citizens will be deprived of their Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury in federal courts by insertion of arbitration clauses in what
are often, in my view, classic adhesion contracts." Id. at 1118 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
75. See Hill, supra note 11, at 10 (finding that nineteen percent of private sector
employers were using arbitration by 1997, up from 3.6% in 1991, and that by 2001 the
number of employees covered by employment arbitration plans administered by the
American Arbitration Association had grown to six million, up from three million in 1997).
76. See Jane Spencer, Waiving Your Right to a Jury Trial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2004,
at DI (noting that the rising cost of arbitration is leading employers to go back to the courts
but require jury waivers), available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56937955.
77. E.g., Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 185 (6th Cir. 1996)
(awarding an employee $750,000 in punitive damages); Barvati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross,
Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1994) (awarding punitive damages of $120,000); Kanuth v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (awarding a CEO $3
million for emotional distress, plus $1 million for punitive damages, as part of overall award
of over $38 million); Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)
(awarding $100,000 in punitive damages); Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct. App. 1998) (adding $1 million punitive award added to actual and
compensatory damages totaling $338,000); Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v. Ulrich, 692 So. 2d
915, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (awarding $625,000 in compensatory damages
supplemented by punitive award of $1,125,000); Turgeon v. City of New Bedford, 12 Mass.
L. Rptr. 401, 401 (Super. Ct. 2000) (denying motion to vacate arbitrator's award of
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the Supreme Court now imposes strict limits on punitive damages awarded
by courts.78 However, this ruling does not extend to arbitrators, who have
great discretion to order relief.79 Whether they impose punitive or make-
whole remedies, they order more damages than before.8 ° Arbitrations are
also more time-consuming
81 and costly.82
Adding to employer disappointment in arbitration, awards in favor of
unspecified punitive damages in addition to back pay, reinstatement, and damages for
emotional distress); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (App. Div.
2003) (awarding a securities broker $2 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in
punitive damages); Davis v. Reliance Elec. Indus. Co., 104 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002) (upholding arbitrator's award of $50,000 for emotional distress claim plus
compensatory damages, and in addition, $520,000 in punitive damages).
78. In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17
(2003), the Supreme Court ruled that excessive punitive damages violate the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. The Court stated: "We decline again to impose a bright-
line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the
principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process." Id. at 425. This decision followed the Court's refusal in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), to sustain a $2 million punitive
damages award which accompanied a $4,000 compensatory damages award.
79. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960) ("The... arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract .... The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed.").
80. See NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, Summary Arbitration Statistics, Damages
Awarded in Customer Complaint Cases, at http://www.nasd.comlweb/idcplg?IdcService
=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=516&ssSourceNodeld=12 (last updated June 15, 2005)
(showing that total awards were $47 million in 1995, $71 million in 1996, $87 million in
1997, $163 million in 1998, $126 million in 1999, $76 million in 2000, $97 million in 2001,
$139 million in 2002, $162 million in 2003, and $194 million in 2004).
81. E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(seventy-four hearing dates and conferences from 1991-1996 with nine postponements by
the employer); Eisenberg v. Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P., 234 F.3d 1261 (2d Cir. 2000)
(arbitration took ten hearing days); Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 103 F.3d 1119 (4th Cir. 1999) (arbitration took nineteen hearing days); Kiernan
v. Piper Jaffray Cos., Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 1998) (arbitration took fourteen
hearing days); Kanuth, 949 F.2d at 1177 (arbitration produced over 7,000 transcript pages
and 1,200 exhibits); Mays v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (M.D.
Ala. 2000) (arbitration took 9 hearing days); Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 49 F. Supp.
2d 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (arbitration took sixty-two hearing days from 1994-1998).
82. E.g., Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[Plarties
spent over $650,000 in fees and costs related to the arbitration."); Campbell v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co., No. 98-9582, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34081, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1999)
(employee was charged with $45,000 in forum fees by the arbitration panel for fifteen
hearing days); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997)
(employee awarded $220,000 in damages but denied $249,050 in attorney's fees); Cassedy
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (prevailing employee was awarded $160,000 in attorneys fees).
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discrimination complainants are usually final and binding because courts
apply an extremely deferential standard of review.
s3 This problem is
aggravated by the fact that arbitrators are allowed to rule without
explaining their awards in writing." Thus, a court cannot determine if the
arbitrator misapplied the law. A new proposal would require a written
explanation for arbitrator rulings but does not apply to employment
disputes." In contrast, appellate courts often overturn verdicts for
discrimination plaintiffs.86 This is because trial court decisions set forth
facts and legal reasoning in written opinions, creating a bigger target for
reversal. In addition, appellate standards are broader compared to
arbitrations. Thus, some lawyers advise firms to use jury waivers in place
of Gilmer arbitrations.
87
83. See the seminal Steelworkers Trilogy, comprised of United Steelworkers v.
American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), for a discussion of the finality of arbitration awards. The
Enterprise Wheel Court stated that an award should not be disturbed unless the arbitrator
"has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas marked
out for his consideration." Id. at 598. Reinforcing this approach, courts that review
individual employment arbitration awards under the FAA apply a "grudgingly narrow"
standard of review. Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 776 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
84. See Green v. Ameritech Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
("[I]n the absence of an express provision requiring the arbitrator to explain the reasoning
for his award, the arbitrator need not do so.").
85. See News Release, NASD, New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations
Upon Investor Request (Jan. 27, 2005), at http://www.nasd.comweb/idcplg?IdcService
=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW013145&ssSourceNodeld= 12. NASD approved
an amendment to the Code of Arbitration Procedure to require a written explanation of the
arbitration panel's decision. This proposed change would alter the current practice of not
requiring written decisions but only in arbitrations of securities industry disputes.
86. Jess Bravin, U.S. Courts Are Tough on Job-Bias Suits, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2001,
at A2, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2869570. After analyzing nine years of federal trial
statistics, Professors Stewart J. Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg concluded that federal
appeals courts are less sympathetic to workers who allege job discrimination than they are to
almost any other type of plaintiff. Id. Appeals courts reversed victories for plaintiffs in
forty-four percent of cases. Id.
87. See Harold M. Brody & Anthony J. Oncidi, Careful What You Wish for: Is
Arbitration the Employer's Panacea? Perhaps There Is a Better Alternative, HR ADVISOR:
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 9 (Nov./Dec. 2003) ("In light of the difficulties that many
of our clients have recently encountered with arbitration, we've been advising them to
consider entering into jury trial waiver agreements with employees instead of arbitration
agreements."); see also Samuel Estreicher & Rene M. Johnson, Contractual Jury Trial
Waivers in Federal Employment Litigation, 229 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2003) (explaining how jury
waivers should be placed in arbitration agreements).
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B. Judge and Jury as Adjudicators of Employment Disputes
1. Title VII Discrimination and Jury Access
The Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury in civil trials. 8
But this does not mean that all civil cases are tried by a jury. Consider
employment discrimination lawsuits. Early in the history of Title VII,
Congress precluded access to juries. Only bench trials could occur because
of concern for racial bias.8 9 This changed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,90
when Congress concluded that juries should be able to hear these cases.91
The provision for tort-like remedies to Title VII adds another factor to jury
access.92 Because relief is expanded beyond equitable remedies to include
damages, juries now play a remedial role in cases of intentional
discrimination. 93 But the empowerment of Title VII juries in the 1991 law
collides with a different authority. Gilmer, decided the same year,
disenfranchises juries by allowing an employer to require arbitration. In
other words, an employer can subvert congressional intent to toughen the
enforcement of Title VII by opting out of the law's elaborate remedy
structure. Under Gilmer, an employee agrees to work without these new
legislative protections or is fired.94
88. See supra note 20.
89. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,445-02, S15,452 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Statement of
Sen. Nickles) (stating during debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that "[w]e have not
had jury trials in Title VII cases before in the private sector"). The absence of jury trials is
explained in M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary
Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311, 357 (1999):
The legislative record for the 1964 Act reveals legislative unease with juries
because they were perceived to be hostile or unfriendly to civil rights claimants.
This was certainly the case with racial discrimination, plainly the driving force
behind the 1964 Act. It was a fair inference for legislators to make from the
response to the federal judiciary-driven push to desegregate the South, that
federal judges would be more receptive to victims of racial discrimination than
primarily white, male juries in the South.
Id.
90. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1) (Apr. 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
610, 1991 WL 70454, at *72 ("Just as they have for hundreds of years, juries are fully
capable of determining whether an award of damages is appropriate and if so, how large it
must be to compensate the plaintiff adequately and to deter future repetition of the
prohibited conduct.").
92. A clear explanation of this complex law appears in Pollard v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 847-54 (2001).
93. See infra note 101.
94. See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (1lth Cir. 2002)
(denying terminated employees' claims of retaliation because plaintiffs could not reasonably
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This' countermanding of legislative intent is approved, interestingly
enough, by the same Congress who increased enforcement of Title VII.
Section 118 of the 1991 law marginalizes juries by allowing "alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration."
95 This sends a
mixed signal about Congress' desire to provide discrimination plaintiffs a
jury trial. Courts who give weight to the vague arbitration policy in section
118 enforce Gilmer contracts.
9 6 This replaces a jury with an arbitrator. But
other courts reason that if Title VII plaintiffs are "forced into binding
arbitration[, they] would be surrendering their right to trial by jury-a right
that civil rights plaintiffs.., fought hard for and finally obtained in the
1991 amendments to Title VII."
9'
2. ADEA Discrimination
When the ADEA was passed, it borrowed the definition of
discrimination from Title VII but adopted the enforcement procedures of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
98 ADEA's silence on jury trials,
combined with its provision for equitable relief, implied that age claims
could only be tried before a judge.
99  But the law's use of FLSA
enforcement powers also suggested that plaintiffs were entitled to juries.'
00
The Supreme Court resolved this confusion by concluding that Congress'
decision to model ADEA enforcement procedures after the FLSA, and not
Title VII, provides a right to a jury trial.
1° ' While the Court reviewed this
believe that refusing to sign compulsory arbitration agreements is statutorily protected
activity).
95. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages "[wihere appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law ... alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration."
96. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 1999) ("We find no conflict between the language or purposes of Title VII, as
amended, and arbitration.").
97. Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997).
98. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)). The enforcement procedure under
Section 7(b) of the ADEA specifies that the rights created by the ADEA are to be "enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of particular sections of the
FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000).
99. See Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 689 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he issues to be
tried in this case [arising under the ADEA] are equitable in nature . . . and not suitable for
trial by jury."), vacated by 435 U.S. 911 (1978).
100. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 952 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding an implied fight to
a jury trial under the ADEA), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 1977) (same).
101. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1978) ("[B]y directing that actions for
lost wages under the ADEA be treated as actions . . . under the FLSA, Congress dictated
that the jury trial right then available to enforce that FLSA liability would also be available
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matter, the Senate amended the ADEA to afford access to a jury' 0 2 Thus,
two sources provide for jury trials, removing any doubt in the matter.
This right is undermined, however, by employment agreements that
waive a worker's right to sue for age discrimination. The Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) addresses this concern. 0 3 Employers use
exit incentives to encourage older workers to retire.' 4 Congress applauds
firms for paying employees to quit, instead of resorting to mass
terminations, 0 5 but objects to incentives that are conditioned upon
waivers. 0 6  The problem is that older workers are "often coerced or
manipulated into signing waivers as a condition of their participation in exit
incentive or early retirement programs.' 0 7
Before this law was enacted, the EEOC did not regulate ADEA
waivers .0  Against this backdrop, Congress heard from older workers who
were forced to waive potential discrimination claims.' 9 Statistics supported
these accounts."10 A General Accounting Office (GAO) study bolstered
this concern."' Lawmakers believe that older workers are exposed to
in private actions under the ADEA." (citation omitted)). The Court believed that
congressional selection of FLSA enforcement procedures meant that Congress also intended
that ADEA plaintiffs have access to juries. Id. The Court relied on comments made by
Senator Javits, a floor manager of the ADEA bill, who explained, "'[t]he enforcement
techniques provided by [the ADEA] are directly analogous to those available under the Fair
Labor Standards Act; in fact [the ADEA] incorporates by reference, to the greatest extent
possible, the provisions of the [FLSA]."' Id. at 582 (alterations in original) (quoting 113
CONG. REC. 31254 (1967)).
102. In 1977, the Senate added an amendment to the bill. See H.R. 5383, 95th Cong.
(1977) (enacted). The amendment explained that damage claims under the ADEA could be
tried to a jury. See 123 CONG. REc. S17, 196 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy).
103. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, and 630).
104. H.R. REP. No. 101-664 (1990), available at 1990 WL 200383. Congress observed
that employers frequently laid off workers because of global competition and merger
activity. Lawmakers concluded that "[e]mployers know that if hundreds of thousands of
employees are simply laid off with no benefits or terminated for cause, the result may be
bitterness and lawsuits. Accordingly, employers have come to rely heavily on early
retirement and other exit incentive programs to reduce their workforce." Id.
105. See id. (stating that exit incentive programs "if properly conceived and
administered, can be both humane and economically efficient. By treating employees with
decency and respect, employers minimize the prospect of litigation from those who leave,




109. Id. ("The House and Senate hearing records are replete with evidence of older
workers who have been manipulated or coerced into waiving their rights under the ADEA.
This evidence, although anecdotal, paints a disturbing picture of waiver practices.").
110. Id.
11t. GAO, Age Discrimination: Use of Waivers by Large Companies Offering Exit
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employer over-reaching in impending layoffs because they are "faced with
a situation that leaves them very few alternatives."
'" 2 Many "employees
are unable even to recognize the potential of their claims because no
dispute exists between them and their employer.""
' 3 Thus, "it is reasonable
to assume that many employees would be coerced by circumstances into
accepting significant compromises."
'"14
In short, Congress pays close attention to the bargaining process when
employers extract age discrimination waivers from older workers. The
ultimate justification for the OWBPA is that "workers are given no reason
to suspect age discrimination and often are not even aware of their rights
under the ADEA. For them, waiving all rights and claims through a
general release effectively chills any meaningful inquiry into whether they
are the victims of unlawful age discrimination."''
5 As a result, the
OWBPA strictly regulates waivers to ensure they are knowing and
voluntary.116
This law states a clear and unequivocal policy, but does not stand in
isolation. Recall that Gilmer involves an ADEA claim, and the majority
opinion emphatically and broadly approves mandatory arbitration. It
rejects the argument that the ADEA precludes waiver of a judicial forum.' "'
Incentives to Employees, GAO/HRD-89-87, at 3, Apr. 1989, available 
at
http://archive.gao.gov/d25t7/1
38 55 9 . In relying on this research, lawmakers found that "80
percent of Fortune 100 companies sponsored an exit incentive program." Id. at 4.




116. Section 201 of the OWBPA adds subsection 7(f)(1) to the ADEA and provides that:
a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum-
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the
employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such
individual, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date
the waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration
in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to
executing the agreement;
(F) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to
consider the agreement; ...
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the
execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and
the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation
period has expired ....
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000).
117. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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But notice that this reasoning contradicts the strict waiver requirements of
the OWBPA. When courts are asked to enforce arbitration agreements that
omit OWBPA waiver procedures, they are torn between conflicting public
policies. Most follow the pro-arbitration signal in Gilmer.'1 8 The few who
enforce the OWBPA"
9 no longer do so.
20
III. THE ROLE OF STATE COMMERCIAL LAW IN MANDATORY JURY
WAIVERS
State law plays a growing role in regulating employment.
Employment-at-will (EAW) is a basic common law principle. 12' But this
rule is crumbling. 122 Courts now apply an array of torts to employment
disputes-for example, the public policy exception to EAW 123 and related
whistleblower protection,124 emotional distress, 12 assault and battery in
severe cases of sexual harassment, 26 negligence, 27 and defamation. 128
State constitutions compound the decline of EAW by creating privacy
rights for workers. 1
29
118. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 661 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that arbitration clause is enforceable).
119. See, e.g., Thiele v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1069 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that "in dicta, the Ninth Circuit in Duffield reads the OWBPA
amendments to the ADEA to include the right to a jury trial. This Court follows the
guidance provided by Duffield"); see also Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that Congress intended to protect an employee from
waiving his or her right to a judicial forum by passing the 1991 Civil Rights Act). The court
extended its reasoning to ADEA claims: "After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Gilmer, Congress amended the ADEA to provide that all waivers of rights under the Act,
apparently including the right to a jury trial must be 'knowing and voluntary' . . . . The
Supreme Court did not, however, consider this new statutory language in Gilmer. Thus,
current ADEA claims may require different treatment." Id. at 1190 n.5 (citations omitted).
120. The Ninth Circuit overruled Duffield, and by extension its dicta for ADEA claims,
with obvious reluctance-and perhaps sullen foreshadowing-in E.E.O.C. v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Duffield, like Bikini
Atoll, now sits ignominiously alone awaiting remediation.").
121. The doctrine was first recognized in H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877), which noted that "[w]ith [American courts] the
rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring isprimafacie a hiring at will."
122. See, e.g., Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
123. E.g., Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66 (Cal. 1998).
124. E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law to an emotional distress claim).
125. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992).
126. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1997).
127. Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
128. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
129. See, e.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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A. An Emerging Trend: Courts Enforce Jury Waivers in Commercial
Lawsuits
State courts regulate jury waivers by applying common law doctrines
alike to commercial and employment contracts. Appellate courts have
recently considered whether parties may agree to pre-dispute jury waivers.
These business contracts are enforced in Alabama,
130 Connecticut, 31
Missouri,'32 Nevada,'33 Rhode Island, 134 and Texas.'
35 Federal courts take a
similar approach.
136
130. Ex Parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 2000) (applying Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412
So. 2d 1197 (Ala. 1982)).
131. L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
132. Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1997).
133. Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 40 P.3d 405
(Nev. 2002).
134. Rhode Island Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Coffey & Martinelli, Ltd., 821 A.2d
222 (R.I. 2003).
135. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
136. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not ruled on contractual jury waivers.
See Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that the
lender had not carried its burden of proving that the borrower knowingly and voluntarily
waived its right to a jury trial because the lender provided no evidence whatsoever as to the
parties' specific negotiations over the waiver, the conspicuousness of the provision, nor the
parties' relative bargaining power). The Second Circuit applies a presumption against
enforcement of jury waivers because the court has found that the right to a jury trial is
fundamental. Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
However, this presumption is not applied if a waiver meets a knowing and voluntary
standard. See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (holding that defendants knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to trial by jury
when they signed the demand note). District courts in the Third Circuit "have consistently
enforced contract provisions waiving the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as long as
the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent." Today's Man, Inc. v. Nationsbank, N.A.,
No. Civ. A. 99-479, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8710, at *11 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2000). The lead
case in the Fourth Circuit, Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986),
holds that "where waiver is claimed under a contract executed before litigation is
contemplated, we agree with those courts that have held that the party seeking enforcement
of the waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary and informed." A Fifth Circuit
district court recently denied enforcement to a jury waiver because the contract language
was "buried in the middle of a lengthy paragraph, not set off from the rest of the text
through differential bold, larger print, italics, or any other form of emphasis or
distinction.... [and was] wholly one-sided." RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp.
2d 811, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2002). However, as a matter of policy, the court said that jury
waivers are enforceable if they are knowing and voluntary. Id. at 813. In K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit ruled that "in the
context of an express contractual waiver the objecting party should have the burden of
demonstrating that its consent to the provisions was not knowing and voluntary." The Ninth
Circuit stated a similar policy in Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad, Inc., 843 F. Supp.
1379 (D. Nev. 1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit placed the burden on the party seeking to enforce a jury waiver
because of a "strong presumption" in favor of jury trials. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of
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These decisions involve commercial transactions, but have direct
implications for employment contracts. Recall that the FAA was passed in
1925 to regulate arbitration agreements for businesses, 37 but today most
courts transplant that law's pro-arbitration policy to workplace disputes.'38
This suggests that common law rulings on jury waivers for commercial
contracts also pertain to employment agreements. Consider, too, that pre-
dispute jury waivers for businesses are valid if parties make a knowing,
voluntary, and intentional decision. 3 9 This resembles OWBPA regulation
of bargaining between employers and employees for discrimination
claims. 
40
Many states apply the same legal test to commercial jury waivers but
give different emphasis to its specific requirements. In a good example that
relates to employment, Alabama enforces jury waivers but only if parties
have equal bargaining power.' 4' By contrast, other states advocate freedom
of contract. Missouri upholds jury waivers because "businesses and
individuals should have the ability to agree to waive a jury if a lawsuit
arises from their contract."'142  Nevada reasons "pre-litigation jury trial
waivers are grounded in the parties' freedom to contract and their
corresponding ability to allocate risk.', 143 These courts only monitor for
abuse of bargaining power in jury waivers.
Underscoring the close relationship between commercial jury waivers
and those in employment contracts, the Texas Supreme Court approves the
former because arbitration is overused. The court reasons "if parties are
willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to enforce that
agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their only enforceable
option."' 44 In arbitration, "parties waive not only their right to trial by jury
but their right to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former
right, they take advantage of the reduced expense and delay of a bench
trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their right to appeal.' 4 5
Also, the
Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982). In sum, federal courts do not
automatically enforce jury waivers. If, however, these contracts meet simple procedural
requirements to ensure that a signer makes a knowing and voluntary decision, then courts
enforce these waivers.
137. See supra note 56.
138. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 70, at 282.
139. See cases cited supra notes 130-35.
140. See supra note 91.
141. Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Ala. 1982) ("[Tihe public policy
favoring jury trials subjects jury waiver agreements to strict construction .... ).
142. Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. 1997).
143. Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 40 P.3d 405,
411 (Nev. 2002).
144. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.2d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004).
145. Id.
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parties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a
manner already afforded to litigants in their courts. Their rights,
and the orderly development of the law, are further protected by
appeal. And even if the option appeals only to a few, some of the
tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute
resolution is stemmed.
46
B. A Minority of Important Courts Deny Enforcement to Jury Waivers in
Commercial Lawsuits
Two important state courts reject jury waivers. Notably, these
commercial decisions discuss employment contracts. A California appeals
court finds that pre-dispute jury waivers violate state law. 147 In overruling
an appellate decision, it reasons that only the legislature can prescribe
methods for a jury waiver. 48  A permissive jury waiver rule promotes
business deals-a rationale in the earlier ruling to enforce a jury
waiver' 49-but ignores California's policy on adhesion contracts.
50
Referring to the workplace, the court believes that employees cannot
reasonably foresee the consequences of a pre-dispute waiver.'' Just
because parties can agree to arbitrate their disputes, they are not free to
modify the state's judicial procedures in their contract.52
The Georgia Supreme Court also rejects pre-dispute jury waivers on
146. Id.
147. Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511,518 (Ct. App. 2004).
148. Id. at 515 (reconsidering Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr.
885 (1991)). Grafton reasoned "California constitutional history reflects an unwavering
commitment to the principle that the right to a civil jury trial may be waived only as the
Legislature prescribes, even in the face of concerns that the interests of the parties and the
courts Would benefit from a relaxation of this requirement." Id. at 515-16.
149. Id. at 516 ("[I]n many commercial transactions advance assurance that any disputes
that may arise will be subject to expeditious resolution in a court trial would best serve the
needs of the contracting parties as well as that of our overburdened judicial system."
(quoting Trizec, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 887)).
150. Id. at 518 n.10. Grafton recognized that "a predispute jury waiver, like the one
here, knowingly entered into between business entities armored with legal representation
may be unassailable." Id. However, the court believed that a broad pre-dispute waiver
policy conflicts with rulings that protect employees and consumers from uninformed
waivers. See id. (stating that adoption of a pre-dispute jury waiver rule "would seem to
entail approval of such waivers in employee and consumer contracts as well, even if the
contracts are adhesive," thereby undermining rulings in Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc., 66 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) and A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
186 Cal. Reptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982)).
151. Id. at519.
152. Id. at 520 ("There is no comparable state policy favoring court trials in the judicial
forum. To the contrary there exists a longstanding public policy in favor of trial by jury.").
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the grounds that they violate the state's constitution. 5 3 The court believes
that the framers of the constitution allowed jury waivers only when
litigation is pending-specifically, "when the parties fail to demand a jury
trial. 154 Since a waiver must be made knowingly, it must occur during
"the pendency of litigation,"''5 but not before a dispute. The court refuses
to equate pre-dispute arbitration agreements and jury waivers. The latter
"entails giving up valuable rights. 156 Georgia statute "carefully control[s]"
when individuals are permitted to forgo these rights. Pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are different, and can be enforced, because
Georgia's legislature enacted an arbitration code.157
IV. COURT RULINGS ON EMPLOYEE CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY JURY
WAIVERS
A. The Sample of Jury Waivers in Employment Agreements
Gilmer was decided in May 1991. A GAO study found that from
1990 to 1992 only eighteen discrimination claims were arbitrated in the
securities industry, the origin of employment arbitration.1 58 Even with this
small sample, the GAO investigated these cases. By comparison, I find
only five court opinions on employee challenges to mandatory jury
waivers. This sample is small but underestimates the prevalence of jury
waivers. Lawyers have only recently advised employers to use these
waivers instead of arbitration. 9 Time is needed to diffuse a new practice.
Consider, too, that most people do not realize they have waived judicial
procedures. That is why the law requires conspicuous notice of a jury
waiver. 16  Even if workers see this information, they are not likely to
understand it. This concern is underscored in Table l's (infra) summary of
153. See Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994). Bank South sued an
individual in a guaranty that contained a pre-dispute jury waiver.
154. Id. at 800 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XI(a), which states that "[t]he right to
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall render judgment without the
verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable defense is filed and where a jury is not
demanded in writing by either party").
155. Bank South, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
156. Id.
157. Id. at800n.5.
158. GAO, Employment Discrimination-How Registered Representatives Fare in
Discrimination Disputes, GAO/HEHS 94-17, Mar. 30, 1994, 1994 WL 836270. The GAO
study reported that only eighteen discrimination arbitrations occurred in the securities
industry between August 1990 and December 1992. Id. at 7.
159. See supra note 87.
160. See, e.g., Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ'g Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ.
0058, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004) (granting Defendants'
motion to strike Plaintiff's demand for a jury trial).
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jury waivers in the sample. In addition, jury waiver challenges cannot be
quantified unless there is a legal dispute. But these are rare. The EEOC
fielded 81,293 discrimination complaints in 2003,161 from approximately
140 million job-holders. 62 At the same time in federal courts, 20,507
workers took their complaint a step farther by filing an employment
discrimination lawsuit.1 63  Thus, about one in every 7,000 employees
annually files a federal discrimination lawsuit. This threshold step in the
dispute resolution process may be the first time a worker learns that she
waived a jury. Unless there is a legal complaint and it proceeds to this
point, a jury waiver cannot be counted.
Table 1: Court Rulings on Mandatory Jury Waivers in Employment Agreements
I ~
Decision by sear - lUlly L e.1l c Ua, in 0 e.L U 0
Morris v. McFarland Waiver Is EnforcedA Fraud/Contract/












Waiver Is Enforced "
Brown v. Cushman & Waiver Is Enforcedc
Wakefield, Inc. (2002)





















Waiver Is InvalidD ADEA/OWBPA General Manager None
Waiver Is InvalidE Emotional Distress/
Breach of Contract
Sales Executive
161. EEOC, Charge Statistics-FY 1992 Through FY 2004, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Jan. 27, 2005).
162. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment
Situation: December 2004 (Jan. 7, 2005) (total employment was at 140.2 million in
December 2004, included 7.8 million individuals who hold more than one job), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit 01072005.pdf.
163. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Filed By
Nature of Suit, Table 2.2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/
table2.02.pdf (under heading Civil Rights, subheading Employment).
None
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A "Each of the parties hereto irrevocably waives all right to trial by jury in any action, proceeding, or
counterclaim arising out of or relating to this agreement." B "Any dispute between the parties relating
to this Agreement that they do not settle between them may only be resolved by the state and federal
courts located in New York ... Each party hereby waives the right to a jury trial in any lawsuit arising
out of or relating to the Agreement or Executive's employment by the Company." c "C & W and
Employee shall and hereby do waive a trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counter-claim brought
or asserted by either of the parties hereto against the other on any matters whatsoever arising out of this
Agreement." D "Employee and Company hereby knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waive any
right either may have to a trial by jury with respect to any litigation related to or arising out of, under or
in conjunction with this Agreement." E The employee "consents to the personal jurisdiction of the
Superior Court of the State of Connecticut and the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut and agrees that any action to enforce the foregoing may be brought in either such court. In
any action or proceeding relating to this Agreement, the parties mutually waive trial by jury."
Jury waivers are undercounted for other reasons. Plaintiff lawyers
who deal with Gilmer arbitrations may see jury waivers as an improvement
for their client, and therefore, acquiesce to their use. Unlike Gilmer
agreements, jury waivers provide access to a court's powerful discovery
procedures.' 6' A client avoids large arbitration fees.165  She is protected
from losing claims that fail to conform to artificially short filing
requirements in arbitration. 66  Courts are imperfect but not "egregiously
unfair," as are some employer-created arbitration systems. 67  Thus,
compared to Gilmer arbitrations and jury trials, a bench trial may be an
acceptable compromise of employer and employee interests. When
plaintiff lawyers reach this conclusion, there is no practical way to
investigate jury waivers. In sum, a jury waiver cannot be counted unless an
employer requires this contract and (a) an employee becomes aware of the
waiver, (b) an employment dispute occurs, (c) a legal complaint is filed, (d)
the employee objects to the waiver, (e) a court rules on the merits of a
challenged waiver, and (f) its opinion is published. Still, why are these five
cases noteworthy? Recall that employment arbitrations blossomed soon
after the GAO studied eighteen discrimination cases. There is potential for
a shift from Gilmer arbitrations to mandatory bench trials. Also, recent
jury waiver decisions in business disputes suggest that these five cases are
the tip of a larger iceberg.
16 8
164. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Judge Edwards
observed that some employers draft mandatory arbitration agreements to shield them from
intrusive discovery procedures. Id. at 1477.
165. See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.
1999) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement that did not provide an accessible forum
and thereby undermined the federal anti-discrimination laws).
166. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2000) (invalidating
an employer's imposition of a sixty-day filing period for ERISA claims that, under the law,
are subject to a filing limit of four years).
167. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying
enforcement of a mandatory arbitration agreement).
168. See cases cited supra notes 130-35.
JURY REVIVAL OR JURY REVILED?
B. Three Courts Enforced Pre-Dispute, Mandatory Jury Waivers in
Employment Lawsuits
In Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publishing Group, LLC,169
a publishing company fired a fifty-four year-old female vice president after
a younger male executive restructured the firm. 70 The male executive fired
Marie Schappert for job-related reasons.' 7' She countered that he
discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender. 7 2  After
Schappert sued in a New Jersey court under that state's employment
discrimination law, the company moved to enforce its pre-dispute
employment agreement. 73 The contract required that an employment claim
be adjudicated in a federal court without a jury. 174 It also provided for
fifteen months of severance salary, which the firm paid.
175
Schappert then petitioned the federal court for a jury trial, claiming
that her waiver was invalid because it violated the knowing and voluntary
standard in the OWBPA. 176  She contended that the jury waiver was
"buried" in the agreement and never discussed. 177 But her employer said
that Schappert had a copy of the agreement for two years before she signed
it and therefore had time to review it.' 78 The company also contended that
the OWBPA only requires disclosure of substantive rights. 179 Because the
right to a jury trial is procedural, no disclosure is required. 80 The court
ruled that Schappert made a knowing and voluntary jury waiver. 81 The
provision was conspicuous and clear, and it appeared right above her
signature. 18 2  The fact that she negotiated a severance payment of
$243,750,183 defeated the argument that she had no bargaining power."'
The court reasoned that when a pre-dispute agreement is negotiable, its jury
waiver is conspicuous, both parties have some bargaining power, and the
party waiving the right has business acumen, the waiver should be
169. No. 03 Civ. 0058, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004).
170. Id. at *5-*7.
171. Id. at *8-*9.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *11-* 12.
174. Id. at "9.
175. Id. at *9 n.4.
176. Id. at *29-*30.
177. Id. at *33.
178. Id. at *32.
179. Id. at *28-29.
180. Id. at *31.
181. Id. at *35.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *9.
184. Id. at *36.
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enforced.
85
A similar result occurred in Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C.18 6 An
Iowa medical clinic recruited a California neurosurgeon.8 7  After she
closed her practice and moved, Dr. Morris failed to obtain an Iowa license,
thus failing to meet a condition for employment. 8 8 She sued for fraud,
breach of contract, and negligence. 89 The clinic moved to enforce a jury
waiver in the contract. 90
The federal court recognized that "[t]he resolution of civil disputes by
trial by jury is of historic and fundamental importance,"'' but ruled that
Dr. Morris executed a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to a
jury.' 92  The parties bargained over terms of employment. Dr. Morris
persuaded the clinic to modify its contract offer by increasing her
relocation expenses and reimbursement for malpractice insurance. 93 The
court concluded that the doctor could have bargained for the jury waiver
too. 194 In careful scrutiny, the court saw Dr. Morris as "a highly intelligent,
well-educated, sophisticated individual.' 95  Furthermore, "[s]he was no
stranger to contract negotiations. At the time McFarland was soliciting her
she was the administrative oversight and contract negotiations manager at
the clinic in which she practiced."'196 Thus, it is "not likely she failed to
notice the waiver provision, and is likely that had she had an objection to it
she would have raised it with McFarland."' 97 The clinic also showed e-
mail messages that expressed Dr. Morris's satisfaction with the contract.
98
Even if there was unequal bargaining power in the negotiations, the
inequality was not "manifestly or grossly in favor of the proponent of the
waiver."' 99 In addition, the jury waiver clause was the only capitalized
print in the agreement, and therefore was conspicuous.E°
The third decision to enforce a jury waiver, Brown v. Cushman &
185. Id. at *34-35.
186. No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26639 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004).
187. Id. at*1.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id. at *14.
192. Id. at *13.





198. Id. at *9. The doctor e-mailed the clinic, stating that the contract proposal "looks
great!" Id. When she returned the signed agreement, she again wrote: "Yes, it's perfect and
so ... yes, i [sic] signed it .. ." Id.
199. Id. at *8.
200. Id. at *9.
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Wakefield, Inc.,20 also involved a well-educated employee. Farran Tozer
Brown earned an MBA from Harvard and worked as an investment banker
before taking a job as a commercial real estate broker.0 2 After she was
fired, she sued for breach of contract and sex discrimination. 23 A
magistrate judge recommended granting the company's motion to enforce
the pre-dispute jury waiver.20 4 The judge agreed that the plaintiff waived
her right to a jury. Giving weight to her work experience and professional
education, the court concluded that Brown could "have negotiated about
the clause if she tried., 205 The judge found no merit in her contention that
the waiver is unenforceable because she did not read the employment
agreement before signing it.2°6 While justifying its waiver ruling, the court
observed that this outcome is no different than cases where courts enforce
arbitration agreements that apply to sex discrimination claims.207 The judge
implied that if this employer had a right to compel Brown to arbitrate her
sex discrimination claims, the company could also require a bench trial.
20 8
C. Two Courts Denied Enforcement to Pre-Dispute, Mandatory Jury
Waivers in Employment Lawsuits
A seventy-three year-old general manager in an insurance office was
fired in Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc.2°9 His termination occurred
soon after a new employer bought the firm.210 Wilbur Hammaker signed an
employment agreement that contained a jury waiver.21 Around this time,
the company allegedly pressured him to retire.212 Hammaker was then fired
and commenced an age discrimination lawsuit.1 3 The employer moved in
federal district court to enforce the contract's pre-dispute jury waiver.21 4
Hammaker responded that the agreement did not expressly waive his rights
under the ADEA. 215 Thus, he did not waive a jury. The court rejected the
firm's view that OWBPA waiver requirements apply only to substantive
201. 235 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
202. Id. at 294.
203. Id. at 292.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 294.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Gateson v. ASLK-Bank, N.V., No. 94 Civ. 5849, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9004 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995)).
209. 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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rights. By a plain reading of the statute, the court concluded if "Congress
wanted the protections of the OWBPA to apply only to substantive rights,
Congress could have adopted language that clearly conveyed such an
intent."216 The court added that the "OWBPA implements Congress' policy
via a strict, unqualified statutory stricture on waivers. 2 7
In Mafcote Industries, Inc. v. Swanson,2 8 a company tried to repossess
its car from a recently fired sales executive. 2 9 The attempted repossession
occurred on New Year's Day, when only a teenager was home. 220 This
took place after Swanson offered to purchase the car and disputed how
much money the company owed him.22' The employer sued, claiming car
theft. 22  Swanson counterclaimed for emotional distress and breach of
contract. 22' As the case went to trial, Mafcote moved to enforce the jury
waiver in the employment contract.224  The court denied the motion,
concluding that a jury waiver is not automatically enforceable.225 In
remanding to a magistrate, the court sent instructions to examine the
conspicuousness of the waiver, whether the parties were represented by
counsel, whether there was a gross disparity in bargaining power between
the parties, the business or professional experience of the party opposing
the waiver, and whether the party opposing the waiver had an opportunity
to negotiate contract terms.
226
V. CONCLUSIONS: JURIES REVILED AND JURIES REVIVED
Employers are beginning to abandon arbitration and are returning to
courts, to manage litigation costs. Mandatory arbitrations are becoming
costly 227 and time consuming. 228  But recent landmark court rulings cap
216. Id. at 581.
217. Id.
218. No. CV960150309S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 115 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 15,
1998).
219. Id. at *5.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *5-*6.
222. Id. at *1.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *13.
225. Id. at *16-17.
226. Id.
227. Disputants in arbitration pay for their forum expenses, while similar costs for trials
are paid by taxpayers. Private forum costs are the arbitrator's fee and expenses, including
travel; fees charged by the entity providing arbitration services, which may include filing
fees and daily administrative fees; space rental fees; and reporter fees. See The Costs of
Arbitration, at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=-7173 (last visited June
25, 2005) (describing the costs saved through arbitration).
228. See supra note 81.
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punitive damages. 229 Today, some employers conclude that courts are not
the problem they once imagined. The culprit is the reviled jury.23 ° While I
focus on employment disputes, my research suggests that firms do not
isolate one dispute resolution process for workers and another for
businesses. The re-evaluation of arbitration is part of a broader effort to
manage all employment and commercial litigation.23 ' This is suggested by
recent state court rulings on mandatory jury waivers in business lawsuits,
232
and similar rulings in employment disputes.233 The import is that certain
firms embed the same pre-dispute resolution processes in boilerplate
contracts.
A one-forum-fits-all-litigation approach is not new. Congress dealt
with this issue when it passed the FAA in 1925. By exempting certain
employment arbitration agreements, Congress believed that workers lack
the bargaining power of businesses. 234 For decades, employers made no
effort to deny workers access to courts by requiring them to arbitrate.
Mandatory employment arbitration did not spread until the early 1990s,
when the securities industry used broker agreements to block
discrimination lawsuits.2 35 Following Gilmer, the Supreme Court in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 2 36 narrowly construed the FAA exemption for
worker arbitration agreements.237 This ignored congressional concern for
workers who are forced to arbitrate.238
229. See supra note 78.
230. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 87, at 7 (explaining why employers choose to use
arbitration over jury trials due to their pro-employee leanings).
231. See Legislation: Amendment to Exclude Wage, Hour Disputes from Class Action
Bill Defeated by Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-13 (Feb. 10, 2005) (reporting on the
Senate's readiness to pass a major overhaul of class action rules after voting down
a proposed amendment that would have excluded class actions based on state civil rights
and wage and hour laws, but was defeated by intense lobbying by business interests).
232. See cases cited supra notes 130-35.
233. See supra Part IV.B.
234. See supra notes 60-61.
235. See Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L. J. 77, 77 (1996) (stating that Gilmer "appeared to open the door
for extensive employer-imposed requirements on employees to arbitrate a broad range of
statutory employment-related causes of action.").
236. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
237. Id. at 119 ("Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of
transportation workers."). The express terms exempt the "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" from FAA coverage, id. at 137, meaning that federal courts lack jurisdiction to
enforce these employment arbitration agreements.
238. Id. at 128 (Stevens J., dissenting) ("As proposed and enacted, the exclusion fully
responded to the concerns of the Seamen's Union and other labor organizations that § 2
might encompass employment contracts by expressly exempting the labor agreements not
only of 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' but also of 'any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce"').
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Today, the Court sees no real difference between businesses and
workers who must waive court access in order to enter into an economic
relationship. 3 9 Thus, the more well-defined line of cases in commercial
disputes is ready to be transplanted to employment lawsuits. The clear
trend of authority is that mandatory jury waivers are enforced.140 But my
research paints a more complex and uncertain picture. Jury waiver
decisions in employment disputes apply the commercial law test for a
knowing and voluntary waiver.24' Courts are less willing to enforce jury
waivers against workers, however, because this standard results in close
242scrutiny of the bargaining that produces the agreement. Firms are
therefore losing the Supreme Court's symmetry and simplicity of requiring
forum waivers for workers and businesses. Jury-waiver courts do not
consciously reflect the concerns of lawmakers who passed the FAA, but the
result is the same. Today's courts, like the 1925 Congress, distinguish
between forum waivers in arm's length business deals and those that are
forced upon unwitting or powerless workers.
These trends are only preliminary, but they box employers into a
corner. The path is clear under Gilmer and Circuit City to impose
arbitration on unwilling workers. However, this private forum shows signs
of backfiring. Yet, when employers use the same contractual method
merely to substitute jury waiver in place of arbitration, courts obstruct this
path. They not only pay closer attention to the arm's length nature of the
bargain, but also take more seriously employment discrimination laws that
provide worker access to juries. The portrait from this study features two
swelling tides moving toward collision-employers who revile juries, and
lawmakers who revive juries to bolster employment discrimination laws.
Until the Supreme Court or Congress clears these muddy waters, my
analysis predicts that employers will be less successful in enforcing
mandatory jury waivers compared to their experience with mandatory
arbitration.
239. Id. at 123 ("We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of
the arbitration process somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context.").
This provokes the bitter charge from dissenters that the majority opinion is "[p]laying
ostrich to the substantial history behind the amendment" that excludes employment
contracts from the FAA. Id. at 128 (Stevens J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Mafcote Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, No. CV9601503095, 1998 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 115 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1998) (upholding a jury waiver agreement).
241. See Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ'g Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ. 0058,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153, at *34-35 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004) (applying a four step
analysis to determine the validity of the waiver agreement).
242. See Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(construing the employment agreement against its drafter).
796
